[MUSIC]

Brian Lehrer: It's The Brian Lehrer Show on WNYC. Good morning again, everyone. Now we continue our WNYC centennial series, 100 Years of 100 Things. Today it's thing number 40, 100 years of the United States as a global superpower. It's a very relevant topic for right now as the second Trump administration takes shape with an America First foreign policy, America First, as they call it, that seeks to pull back from global leadership in certain ways while still maintaining the world's most lethal military.

President-elect Trump talks about no more endless wars, pulling out of the Paris Climate Treaty, NATO, and the World Health Organization, but he also said this week that, "America's enemies are on notice, our military will be great again and America will never back down." Quite a contrast from President Harry Truman in 1945 at the signing of the United Nations Charter.

President Harry Truman: If any nation would keep security for itself, it must be ready and willing to share security with all. That is the price which each nation will have to pay for world peace. Unless we are all willing to pay that price, no organization for world peace can accomplish its purpose, and what a reasonable price that is.

Brian Lehrer: Harry Truman in 1945. What was American leadership in the so-called American century? The 20th century? How good or bad for the United States and the world and what should the country's global role and global aspirations be today? We'll also tell you when and why the word superpower was coined. It's 100 years of the United States as a global superpower now with Richard Haas, former president of the Council on Foreign Relations think tank, a former US Diplomat himself, senior counselor at the global investment firm Centerview Partners, and author of books, including his most recent, The Bill of Obligations: The Ten Habits of Good Citizens, and one he released in 2020, humbly titled The World: A Brief Introduction. Richard, thanks for joining our 100 Years of 100 Things series. Welcome back to WNYC.

Richard Haass: My humble self is happy to join you, Brian.

Brian Lehrer: Our frame is 100 years, but can we start briefly with the founders of the United States? Wasn't there a stated commitment to try to avoid much entanglement in global affairs?

Richard Haass: There was. George Washington famously said in his farewell address that we should avoid "entangling alliances". It was understandable. The old world, that is Europe, was seen as a place of endless machination and America's independence. The idea of forming the new world was to reject that sort of diplomacy. Second of all, the new country had to focus on itself. If you recall the Articles of Confederation, Constitution 1.0, if you will, was a total failure. Then under Washington, you had the post-Constitution government, what we now call the Constitution, but it had to build itself, new states, developing the continent.

For the first phase of our history, the United States was wary of the old world and very much focused on building itself politically, socially, and economically. We were only 3 million people at the time, by the way, when we were formed. The country had a lot of work to do here at home.

Brian Lehrer: I think many histories of the US as a global superpower begin with the Spanish-American War in 1898. Is that where you would start?

Richard Haass: No. That to me was not a serious moment. A bit of a flirtation with almost European-style colonialism. I would probably begin it a few decades later in the American entry into World War I, as halting as it was, but in some ways that's immaterial because both of them, both the Spanish American episode as well as World War I, were time-bound. That is, they were American involvements, but neither one endured. They were in some ways inconsistent with what we've seen beginning with World War II.

Brian Lehrer: Although some of the critique that has endured through the second half of the 20th century, at least largely from the left, does look at the Spanish-American War as the beginning of an interest in being a colonial power or an imperial power on the part of the United States, in addition to any way that it may have been Good Samaritan on the world stage. There's any of that that you acknowledge?

Richard Haass: Not a whole lot. United States doesn't have much of a history as a colonial power. The idea that we were running around the world to exploit, yes, there were elements of it in the Americas, but not more broadly. I think it's a fairer charge to say that ultimately not then, but later, became something of an imperial power but I don't mean that in a pejorative way. The idea that we had goals in terms of how we wanted to organize the world.

By and large, I'm actually struck by how little of American foreign policy has been about creating economic wealth for itself in the direct sense. Indeed, if you think about rushing ahead in time, say the Gulf War and then the Iraq War, what's interesting to me is despite all we invested in both conflicts, how little we gained economically from them. We didn't come away, for example, with massive oil concessions or anything like it. In my own experience, and I've worked for four presidents, Democrat and Republican alike, I can't remember conversations where people were talking about how do we make foreign policy about improving the American economy in any direct sense.

Brian Lehrer: Of course, we're still trying to figure out the right relationship with Puerto Rico, which was seized in the Spanish-American War, and some other things. You made a distinction a minute ago between colonialism and imperialism. Did I hear that right? Would you elaborate on that?

Richard Haass: Yes, sir. When I hear the word colonialism, I think of that largely as a European phenomenon, not exclusively, but largely. We had some of our own experience, as you mentioned, but I see that largely for the purpose of exploitation. In some cases then it was a way station on the way to post-World War II independence, but there was very little about colonialism or the colonial era where the powers that controlled did it for anything but themselves. This was not, shall we say, philanthropy.

The imperialism seems to me something different where it's less motivated by economics or exploitation and more about ideological or political or political-military type concerns. I think it's fair to say that at times, particularly in the post-World War II era, United States had certain imperial tendencies in its foreign policy and again, it's almost a philosophical conversation.

I'll probably lose some of your listeners here where I would say in many cases, not in all cases, we were inconsistent, we were hypocritical at times, but some of our motives were actually quite high-minded. The idea of trying to discourage the use of force to acquire territory and things like that, to keep people free of the sway of the Soviet Union. Those were imperial foreign policies about shaping an order rather than colonial, which was more about what we can get out of it economically for ourselves.

Brian Lehrer: We'll definitely come back to some of the contradictions of US policy during the Cold War era, but let's skip ahead to just after World War I. President Woodrow Wilson led the effort to establish the League of Nations as a global deliberative body, which ultimately failed before World War II. Why did Wilson want that from a do-gooder standpoint or a US interest standpoint? Were we a superpower yet after World War I?

Richard Haass: Let me start with your second question. A superpower is a definition based upon relative and absolute strength. It's how strong you are and how strong you are compared to others, and then second of all, the will to use it. I would not describe the United States as a superpower at that time. Others were stronger, say, Germany ultimately. Not immediately after World War I, but much later in the late '30s, Japan ultimately in the '30s, and above all, the United States didn't have much in the way of will to use it.

We were much more, again, concerned about keeping to ourselves. This was a fairly strong isolationist period of American foreign policy. I would not call us a superpower at the time. Wilson, what's interesting about him was two things to me. One is, as you suggest, his interest in creating the League of Nations. That was part of both idealism. More than that, there was a hope that you could create some type of an international mechanism that would help keep the peace.

The idea of World War I was seen as the war to end all wars. No one imagined at the time it would automatically or necessarily lead to a second world war. There was a mixture of idealism but also practicalism. The idea was to share some of the burdens of war avoidance among the major countries of the world, to establish certain principles and norms. I think Wilson also had a more idealistic side with his 14 points, essentially to try to promote what he called self-determination and so forth around the world.

Indeed, he gave rise to what continues to this day of one of the basic strands of American foreign policy, which is to shape not so much the foreign policies of others, but to shape the internal nature of other countries and societies.

Brian Lehrer: I don't think any president would give a speech called a 14-point speech today because we don't have the attention span for it, but do I remember my history correctly, that point number 14 was supposed to be the standout one?

Richard Haass: Yes. If I remember correctly, I don't have it in front of me either. It's trouble with mentioning things, then you get follow-up questions. There was the issue of the League of Nations and the idea that you would create a standing international organization that would collectively keep the peace.

Brian Lehrer: Now, the term America First surfaces prominently for the first time in the camp that did not want the United States to enter World War II. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, as we all know, made it inevitable. Before that, why did FDR want to shed American blood and spend American dollars in that European war and Asian War, and again with what US interests in addition to obviously the horror of Nazism?

Richard Haass: America First was about the idea that we could safely avoid involvement in Europe's wars. There was a skepticism and unwillingness to differentiate between Nazism and Imperial Japan and others. Indeed there might have even been-- not might have, there was some sympathy in certain quarters of the United States for Nazism and some of their prejudices. I think it was a mix of isolationism and ideology.

FDR saw the world differently, was worried about the march of National Socialism, of that kind of authoritarian systems, was worried about its implications for us, for America's well-being, also had some instinctive sympathy and above all for the British, for fellow democracies, but he was also extraordinarily cautious. What's so interesting to me about FDR's stewardship of the United States in the '30s was how careful it was, how cautious it was. He was a leader caught between where he wanted to take the country and where the country was, and he had a tread extraordinarily carefully.

His policy in some ways was one of gradualism, and he was very careful not to get too far out in front of a country which, among other things was heavily influenced by the America Firsters.

Brian Lehrer: I've read that the word superpower was coined to refer to the United States, the British Empire, and the Soviet Union in 1944 during World War II. Are you familiar with its origin?

Richard Haass: I was going to say you're ahead of me on that. I should have done my homework before this. I thought it came later, so I defer to you.

Brian Lehrer: I saw it on a few websites. That's really all I know. I learned that this morning.

Richard Haass: All the same, you're ahead of me.

Brian Lehrer: We'll leave that as possibly true. Listeners, as usual in our 100 Years of 100 Things segments, we invite your oral history calls. For today, if your family background is from any country other than the United States, how has the US, as a global superpower, affected your family or your country of origin for better or worse? If your heritage is from anywhere in Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia, or the Middle East, what story is most important to tell about the US as a global superpower and the country and community you come from, for better or for worse? What role would you like to see the US play in the world now? 212-433-WNYC, 212-433-9692.

Anybody from anywhere or whose forebears come from anywhere want to enter on that? I will just say as a caveat that next week we'll do a separate 100-year segment on the US role in the Middle East, specifically, with that being so central to America's place in the world now. We will look mostly for its relationship with other regions today, but if your family background is from any country other than the United States, how has the US as a global superpower affected your family or your country of origin, for better or worse?

Or if you're from this country for many generations, how has your view of the US as a global superpower, as an American, changed in your lifetime? 212-433-WNYC, 212-433-9692. Call or text with Richard Haass, former President of the Council on Foreign Relations, among other things. Continuing the timeline, Richard, World War II ends and the US helps lead creation of the United Nations. We played one Truman clip earlier from the signing of the UN Charter in 1945. Here's one more.

President Harry Truman: We all have to recognize, no matter how great our strength, that we must deny ourselves the license to do always as we please. No one nation, no regional group can or should expect any special privilege which harms any other nation.

[applause]

Brian Lehrer: Similar question to one I asked before, how much did the US want that with the League of Nations, because it felt called to serve in a global context, and how much for the US's own purposes?

Richard Haass: I don't see it as much in the US's own purposes. I think it was a slightly idealistic dimension of American foreign policy. What's so interesting about President Truman is that you had two dimensions, if you will, of his approach to the world. One was the United Nations, which was born amidst World War II, and by the way, before we knew that the United States and the Soviet Union, which were allied during World War II, were going to become adversaries in the aftermath.

It wasn't overly, if you will, or totally unrealistic, but Truman hedged his bets and you had the UN as one dimension of American foreign policy, and not just the UN, by the way, other institutions, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Global Trade Organization, and so forth, but as a hedge. In some ways what became far more significant was the American alliance system, the close ties to allies in Europe, the close ties to allies in the Asia Pacific. That became the real foundation of America's approach to the world after World War II, particularly once the Cold War began and the UN, as you know, provided vetoes to the permanent powers, one of which was the Soviet Union.

The UN, as a serious instrument of American foreign policy, ended almost immediately with that. It became a sometimes, not always useful form for talking for diplomacy but the UN collectively didn't do a whole lot in terms of promoting or safeguarding world order. That became the function of America's alliances, and that became the real center of America's approach to the post-World War II world.

Brian Lehrer: We're in the Cold War era now, of the competing superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, it led a line of US Presidents to argue that we were champions of global freedom, often drawing attention to the Berlin Wall. Here's President Kennedy in Berlin in the early 1960s.

President Kennedy: Today, in the world of freedom, the proudest boast is ich bin ein Berliner.

[applause]

Brian Lehrer: Translation, I am a Berliner. Here's President Reagan in the late '80s.

President Reagan: General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization, come here to this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate.

[applause]

President Reagan: Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.

[applause]

Brian Lehrer: One of the most famous lines from any president of the last 100 years. Richard, if the America First movement, Pre World War II, was a right-wing isolationist movement, the Cold War era is when the left really became the prominent critics of US superpower status. I think it's accurate to say the Vietnam War, especially, was protested as not just unnecessary, but as a war of American aggression. Same with US Involvement in Latin America, seen by critics as mostly for the benefit of multinational corporations, the defense industry, and those who wanted imperial glory and just power for the country.

We fought for freedom for Eastern Europe, but we often supported dictators who supported us. In your own opinion, does a fair telling of history have to include those darker motives?

Richard Haass: I wouldn't agree so much with the darker motives, but I would agree with we were at times hypocritical. We often spoke of the "free world" when we were willing to support individuals and countries and governments that were anything but democratic simply because they were anti-communist. We have to acknowledge that hypocrisy or inconsistency in American foreign policy. Again, where we overreached, and the principal examples of overreach, I would say, were in Korea, not in liberating South Korea, but in trying to unify all of Korea by force in 1950, the Vietnam War, more recently in Iraq in 2003.

In my experience, Brian, they were not motivated by the things the left has suggested. They were not motivated by economic considerations, far more ideological. Again, I think we overreached. I was a critic of the Iraq War, a critic of Vietnam, though I was young at the time, Korea was before my time. Again, in my experience, when the United States has fought these wars of choice, that I believe history has properly shown to have been ill-advised, I don't think the motives were what the left suggests.

Again, in all my experience in the Situation Room, those kinds of arguments just didn't arise. Again, we made mistakes, but it was much more for reasons of geopolitics or ideology than it was for economic advancement.

Brian Lehrer: Here's a call. Irene in Glen Head on Long Island. You're on WNYC. Hi, Irene.

Irene: How are you?

Brian Lehrer: Good and you?

Irene: Should I tell you my story, or do you want to ask me a question?

Brian Lehrer: No, you can just tell your story. Sure.

Irene: My parents actually did not come to the US with the intention of staying. My dad came with a work contract for somewhere between two and four years. During that time, the US-

Brian Lehrer: From the country of, may I ask?

Irene: Oh, I'm sorry. From Chile.

Brian Lehrer: Thank you.

Irene: During that time, the US government backed an overthrow of democratically elected President Allende, and because my father was a supporter of Allende, it became extremely dangerous for us to be able to go back. The way that the US policy affected my family is that here we are, so many years later, living on Long Island, New York.

Brian Lehrer: What conclusion does your family's experience lead you to draw about the United States' influence on Chile or the region?

Irene: As the guest was just saying, overreach and the financial interest of corporations because that was the underlying reason that there was a lot of private money invested in the mines that were very valuable at the time and they were going to be, or maybe partially already were-- I was a child, the history is almost sketchy in my head. Had already started to be-- They wanted to become government. They were taken over by the government in order for the profits to go to the country instead of the corporations.

The US government backing their corporate interests is what led to that with many-- The movie Missing then tells the story of the American journalists that were missing. Because of corporate interest, a lot of people were killed and a lot of people were displaced. I still have many people in different parts of the world as a result of this.

Brian Lehrer: Thank you for your call, Irene. I appreciate it. Alawai in D.C. you're on WNYC. Hello, Alawai.

Alawai: Hi, can you hear me?

Brian Lehrer: I can hear you, yes.

Alawai: Hi. My name is Alawai, and it means always moving forward. I'm Nigerian. My parents came from Nigeria more than 30 years ago. I just know that our life would not be able to be as fruitful if we were in Nigeria currently. I love Nigeria, that's homeland for sure but when my dad came here, he was able to get his education. He became a mechanical engineer, got his master's. I think building on that, I was able to also get my master's and my sisters were able to go into higher education. One of my sisters is a doctor. I just think we wouldn't have had the same availability in education if we did stay in Nigeria.

Brian Lehrer: That's your experience as an immigrant. Does US Policy toward Nigeria enter into this story in any way?

Alawai: I'm not an immigrant. My parents are immigrants.

Brian Lehrer: Sure.

Alawai: What was the question again? Sorry.

Brian Lehrer: Oh, just whether US Policy toward Nigeria comes into your family's story in addition to your family's immigration story, which it sounds like is obviously a positive one.

Alawai: I have a bunch of family in Nigeria. It's really hard to get a visa to come to America because of the multiple bans that have been put on in the past. I think there's hatred towards Nigerians because of the scams you hear and things like that. It's very hard to get a visa if you are Nigerian or you want to make a better life. It was probably easier for my dad back in the day and right now it's actually way harder.

Brian Lehrer: Alawai, thank you very much. One more in this set. Amir in Brooklyn, you're on WNYC. Hi, Amir.

Amir: Hello. Thank you, Brian, for taking my call. I am an Iraqi American. My mother is 12th generation. Her family came around the time of the Mayflower to the colonies, and my father is an immigrant who relocated to the United States in the 1960s. My entire life has been defined by the relationship between the United States and Iraq. My family's life in Iraq has been severely affected by the US foreign policy invasions from supporting Saddam Hussein in the 1980s during the war against Iran and genocide against Kurds in various war crimes that he committed, then in 1991 bombing and then 12 years of sanctions, then the 2003 invasion.

It just completely overturned any sense of civil life in Iraq. People who had a very comfortable middle-class, comfortable background, their lives were bombed into what's referred to as the Stone Age. Until now in 2024, their lives are still in a disastrous state.

Brian Lehrer: Do you, Amir, in your family's experience or just your perception of the Iraqi national experience, separate the so-called first Gulf War in 1991 from the Iraq War which started in 2003 in terms of the US effects of that, or do you think the country would have been better off had Saddam Hussein continued and been allowed to continue his rule?

Amir: It's a double-edged sword. The 1991 war was prompted by Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. Saddam was a dictator. He was brutal to his own people. He also invaded Iran and Kuwait and was causing turmoil in the region. There was a turning point at the end of the '91 war where there was actually an uprising in Iraq, and many people believed that that was going to be the end of Saddam's dictatorship. Instead, the US Made a decision to keep him in power.

I won't go into details, but then he remained in power. He became stronger in Iraq, but meanwhile, the country became disabled as a superpower and was no longer able to cause damage in the region. It's very hard to say whether the life of an Iraqi today would be better or worse when you look at how horrible the circumstances are now, and that basically the US left Iraq in the hands of the very people and the very regime that it claims to be against right now.

Brian Lehrer: Amir, thank you for your call and your complex interpretation. 1990, the Cold War had just ended. President George H.W. Bush vows to reverse the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and goes this far as he is rallying the allies to support US military action there in 1991.

President George H.W. Bush: What is at stake is more than one small country. It is a big idea. A new world order where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind, peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law.

Brian Lehrer: Richard, I think you worked for President Bush, right?

Richard Haass: I was the person who wrote that speech. [laughs]

Brian Lehrer: Really?

Richard Haass: Yes.

Brian Lehrer: Why did you frame it in such grand terms? Not just we have to reverse this invasion of Kuwait, we don't want Saddam Hussein to dominate the world's oil supply and be able to jack up the price or whatever, but put it in those global terms of a new world order?

Richard Haass: We put it in general terms because as you correctly said, this was right after the end of the Cold War, right after the fall of the Berlin Wall. We approached this crisis not simply as a local crisis where the stakes were energy supplies and security in the Middle East, but we also approached it as the first test of the post-Cold War world. We thought what we did and how we did it would have real ramifications for the next era of history. That's why we worked as much as we could through the United Nations and we had more than 10 or 12 UN resolutions.

We did this with the rest of the world. We also had certain limited goals. Just to disagree with the caller, our goal was not to keep Saddam Hussein in power, but our goal was to abide by our mandate, which was to liberate Kuwait. We thought if we underscored this general principle that territory was not to be acquired by force and those who tried would pay a serious price, we would discourage others from following suit. By the way, we succeeded pretty well for several decades until Vladimir Putin decided that he would acquire territory by force against Ukraine twice now. That was the thinking. We were very aware that we were setting precedents in everything we did and how we did it.

Brian Lehrer: It's WNYC centennial series, 100 years of 100 things. It's thing number 40, the United States as a global superpower, for better or worse, over the last 100 years. We'll finish up with Richard Haass after a short break with a few of his thoughts on the apparent new America First era about to dawn. Stay with us.

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Brian Lehrer: Brian Lehrer on WNYC. A few more texts coming in from people whose family backgrounds are from other parts of the world and the callers we've heard from. Listener writes, "I'm Korean American. Korea was arguably the first act of theater of the Cold War that persists on the peninsula today. The Korean War never ended. The 1953 ceasefire didn't end the war. The US remains a big presence on the peninsula, and we supported a series of authoritarian regimes."

Another text, "As an Irish American with relatives on both sides, I would cite the Northern Ireland peace process as a positive use of US Global power. Facilitating that negotiation helped end the violence and brought about a chance of prosperity for the Northern Irish. I wish we did more with our power for peacemaking."

Richard, we just have a few minutes left in the show. Here we are now with the second Trump administration coming in, as we all know, plans are to pull out of the Paris Climate Accords again, maybe out of NATO as a mutual defense organization. Trump said this recently about the alternative network of relationships he's building, not with other democracies, but with other authoritarian leaders.

President Trump: I had a very good relationship with President Xi, a very good relationship with Putin, and a very good relationship with Kim Jong Un, who has a nuclear force that you won't even believe. If I'm friendly with people, if I can have a relationship with people, that's a good thing, not a bad thing in terms of a country.

Brian Lehrer: That was just last month at a Bloomberg event. At the same time Richard, as I noted in the intro, Trump said this week that, "America's enemies are on notice, our military will be great again and America will never back down." What does it add up to for his plans for America's role in the world in 2025, if you can tell?

Richard Haass: I think the most obvious thing is a more limited involvement with the world. It's a more pinched notion of America's stake in the world. Second of all, as you suggested, it doesn't travel through allies. Joe Biden carried out a traditional alliance first foreign policy. That, in some ways, I think makes sense because allies are force multipliers. They are the comparative advantage of the United States. We have dozens of would-be partners.

Mr. Trump prefers a much more transactional approach. Allies aren't seen as special to him. In many cases, he sees them as economic competitors on the military side as doing inadequate effort, and he's more than willing to reach out to authoritarian regimes. Again, I have no problem in negotiations. I've never thought diplomacy was a favor we do for authoritarian regimes, but again, we tend to do better when we approach them with our allies on our side and when we approach them with 2020 vision and have no illusion about their values and about their agendas.

We're simply going to have to see where Mr. Trump takes us. He's going to have an early test, Brian, in Ukraine and whether he's willing to stand up to Vladimir Putin and Russia. He's going to have tests in the Middle East, he's going to obviously, ultimately have tests with China. He inherits a far more difficult inbox this time around than he did eight years ago. I would say some of his early appointments, some, I think, are pretty strong, and some, I'll be honest with you, raise more questions than anything else.

Brian Lehrer: In our last 30 seconds, any comment on any of these particular controversial national security or foreign relations nominees, Tulsi Gabbard, Pete Heath, Elise Stefanik, Mike Huckabee?

Richard Haass: It's hard to feel sanguine. I feel pretty good about Marco Rubio at State and the new National Security Advisor, Mike Waltz. They're experienced and they have independent records. The other individuals you mentioned, I think one has qualms for good reason, given their lack of relevant extreme experience and many of the things they've said.

Brian Lehrer: With Richard Haass, so ends 100 years of 100 things, number 40. 100 years of America as a global superpower. Richard, thank you so much for giving us so much time. We really appreciate it.

Richard Haass: Thanks for having me back, Brian.

Brian Lehrer: We'll go on to thing 41 on Monday, a closer look at one of these topics, America's relationship with the Middle East over the last 100 years. That's The Brian Lehrer Show for today, produced by Mary Croke, Lisa Allison, Amina Srna, Carl Boisrond, and Esperanza Rosenbaum. Our interns this term are Andres Pateko Hiron and Olivia Greene. Megan Ryan is the head of Live Radio, and that was Juliana Fonda and Shayna Sengstock at the audio controls. Stay tuned for Alison.

 

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